Of Course, US Actions May Facilitate China’s Advance in Latin America
Credit: Legado de Las Américas
A heated debate is unfolding in Washington's foreign policy circles regarding the U.S. role in inadvertently boosting China's growing influence in Latin America. While Ryan Berg's Foreign Policy article, "China Won’t Be the Obvious Winner in Latin America,” downplayed this concern, R. Evan Ellis, a former State Department official, has penned a sharp rebuttal. Ellis contends that current U.S. actions, rather than curbing China, are actually creating opportunities for its expansion.
Ellis, who served on Secretary Pompeo’s Policy Planning staff, acknowledges efforts to counter Beijing. However, he challenges Berg’s four core arguments, asserting they either misinterpret the regional reality or highlight U.S. vulnerabilities that China is expertly exploiting.
China's Unrelenting Strategic Advance
Contrary to Berg’s belief that China's economic "headwinds" would limit its progress, Ellis highlights China's aggressive push into critical Latin American sectors. He points to Beijing's growing dominance in telecommunications, cloud computing, renewable energy, and strategic minerals. Examples include China’s control of a significant portion of Chile’s electricity transmission and its exclusive hold over Peru’s Chancay megaport. Ellis argues that a decline in Chinese policy bank lending doesn't signal retreat but rather a "worrisome increase in sophistication," with Beijing now utilizing more commercial and internal financing to dominate markets.
Distrust Coexists with Pragmatism
While Latin American distrust of China exists, Ellis argues it has historically coexisted with a pragmatic pursuit of economic and political benefits. He suggests that perceived negative U.S. actions—such as talk of military action against neighbors, tariffs, and migrant expulsions—are tarnishing the U.S. image and potentially pushing Latin American nations closer to Beijing.
DFC and "Red Lines" Prove Insufficient
Ellis acknowledges the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) as a valuable tool but cautions it's not a panacea. Channeling private capital into volatile regions remains difficult, and successful investments might even complement China’s efforts. He also identifies a contradiction between incentivizing domestic supply chains with tariffs and simultaneously trying to encourage U.S. investment abroad.
Regarding Berg's "red lines" argument, Ellis notes that while some limited U.S. successes exist, China’s strong retaliatory measures and willingness to "fight to the end" suggest these deterrents are largely ineffective.
Multi-Alignment Facilitates Chinese Gains
Both Ellis and Berg agree that Latin American nations are "multi-aligned" and seek to avoid choosing between the U.S. and China. However, he argues this multi-alignment actually facilitates China’s advance. Faced with perceived U.S. threats, Latin American states are more likely to seek balance through new partnerships, including with the PRC, making them less susceptible to U.S. pressure and more open to Chinese products and investments.
Erosion of U.S. Standing
Finally, Ellis echoes Berg’s concern about the dismantling of U.S. institutions and programs. Pointing to shuttered U.S. government activities and potential budget cuts to the State Department. This, combined with what some allies might perceive as a diminished U.S. commitment to goodwill and democratic values, puts the U.S. at a severe disadvantage against a China that can fully leverage its state-controlled economy. Ellis concludes that underestimating China's advance in Latin America in this context presents significant risks for both the U.S. and the region.
